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Abstract

Catholicism has built up a legalistic religion based on two pillars: salvation by works and
“auricular” confession of sins to a priest with judicial functions. Since the Reformation, many
consider auricular confession inferior to less institutional and more individual conceptions of
faith. This article analyzes how all these historical solutions trade off specialization advantages
against exchange costs to produce moral enforcement. After showing the behavioral foundations
of confession and the adaptiveness of its historical evolution, it tests hypotheses on its efficacy,
exploitation and opportunity cost. Econometric evidence supports the efficacy but not the
exploitative character of Catholic confession. It also explains its secular decline as a consequence
of two factors. First, the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly.
Second, the productivity gap suffered by confession, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.
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1. Introduction

Confession of sins has been a controversial institution, especially after becoming one of the
main divides in the Reformation. At that time, attention focused on the form that was to survive
in the Catholic church: “auricular” (oral) confession to a priest with the power to forgive sins (the
“power of the keys” which, according to Catholic doctrine, Christ granted to His Church). Some
thinkers consider auricular confession useful for psychological and social welfare. They also
consider the role of free will in its supporting theology of salvation by works to be a stepping
stone of Western civilization,1 and the doctrine of penance, in particular, to be a main source of
Western criminal law.2 Most, however, see auricular confession as oppressive or ineffective.
Among them, Adam Smith, for whom it was “introduced by the Roman Catholic superstition,”
led to an impossibly detailed codification of moral behavior (“casuistry”) and gave the clergy too
many opportunities for improving their revenues.3 Even better known is the more general thesis
of Max Weber (1920a), according to which the Catholic emphasis on salvation by works and
grace, accompanied by easy forgiveness through auricular confession, is inferior in terms of
motivating individuals’ productivity relative to Protestant salvation by grace alone, especially in
its Calvinist version.
The Weber thesis has prompted innumerable works at the macroeconomic level, trying to
explain growth differentials as a consequence of the dominance of different religions. It seems to
have been refuted in terms of comparative economic growth because, for instance, Catholic
communities experienced higher growth rates during the relevant period.4 For many, it is also
inconsistent with the history of economic thought, as Catholic theologists of the 16th century were
the first in justifying the essential traits of capitalism (Hayek, 1989: 5; Rothbard, 1995: 97-133).
However, the difficulties of measuring these phenomena, the fact that predominantly Protestant
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For instance, White (1978: 146-147), Delumeau (1992) or Hopkins (1999: 130-131).
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See Berman (1983), especially Chapter 4.
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The critique on casuistry occupies most of the last chapter of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).
Smith remarks on the agency costs of confession in The Wealth of Nations (1776: 789-790).
4

Mainly, Samuelson (1993). The debate goes on, however. For instance, Blum and Dudley (2001) find
evidence of positive economic consequences of Protestantism in terms of cooperation. A broader defense
of Weber’s thesis has been offered by Landes (1998).
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countries have until recently experienced higher growth rates, and the current dominance of
individualistic forms of ethics and religiosity keep the Weber thesis alive. More generally,
variants of the Weber thesis are invigorated by the accumulating evidence on the effects of
religion on behavior (for instance, on crime, addictions, physical and mental health, marriage or
fertility), despite the considerable, albeit unsuccessful, efforts of many scholars to show that the
observed statistical effects are spurious because of self-selection biases and the presence of
common causal factors.
In contrast, little work has been done on confession institutions at the microeconomic and
micro-analytical levels. Previous analyses of the confession of sins have studied some of its
important elements and episodes. For instance, the theology of purgatory, seen by Ekelund,
Hébert and Tollison (1992) as an invention designed to facilitate price discrimination. Likewise,
the establishment by the Pope of mendicant orders is conceived by Schmidtchen and Mayer
(1997) as a device to extract the rents enjoyed by parishes. These works, like most of the modern
literature on the economics of religion,5 apply standard assumptions about human behavior—in
particular, perfect rationality at the level of the individual or the church. Consequently, they tend
to see penance as the price paid for a service consisting of eternal salvation, this being a mere
consumption good whose quality is constant, whatever the production process used to provide it.
As shown in section 4.2, this perspective is useful for analyzing some specific features of
confession at a particular time but it seems insufficient for understanding the function and
persistence of confession. In particular, the argument by Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison, who see
Catholic confession purely as a rent extraction device, looks incomplete. Rent seeking, and
transaction costs more generally, are inherent in all kinds of trade and specialization between
self-interested individuals transacting in a world of imperfect information. Therefore, the

5

See Iannaccone (1998) for a survey of the economics of religion. Most models are based on Becker’s
theory of household production. Individuals allocate resources among religious and secular activities
using a utility function with afterlife and life-time components, in which religious activity provides
afterlife consumption. The theory has been extended to a “club” theory of churches which has
considerable explanatory power for some aspects of behavior, such as church attendance and religious
strictness. It does not deal, however, with the interesting issues of how religious membership and beliefs
may provide material, life-time benefits for individual members and adaptive (competitive) advantage for
human groups. As pointed out by Wilson in his analysis of Iannaccone (1994b), without such benefits
religion would be a mere exploitative device (2002: 165-71). To some extent, this ties in with more recent
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presence of even systematic rent seeking, by itself, does not tell us all about the function or
efficiency of an institution.
This article draws a more balanced and fuller picture by conceiving confession of sins as an
adaptive institution that produces self- and social-control services. Section 2 formulates the
analytical framework, which sees auricular confession as a form of specialization burdened with
transaction costs. It focuses on the superior incentives that this specialization makes possible, the
presence of agency costs and the dependence of its achievements on exogenous economic
variables, in particular, the education level of the laity and unbalanced productivity growth.6 The
remaining sections expound and prove this argument relying on behavioral, historical and
quantitative evidence. First, Section 3 justifies the function of moral enforcement and confession,
relying on basic insights from evolutionary and experimental psychology, which show the
potential productive advantages of religious beliefs and confession practices. Section 4
summarizes the historical evolution and nature of Christian moral enforcement solutions,
focusing on confession of sins and showing the adaptiveness of its three main stages: high
medieval practices, which relied on public confession and worldly satisfaction; auricular
confession, adopted in the 13th century in conjunction with a full set of innovations in beliefs and
organization; and the Protestant substitution of auricular confession by moral enforcement
exercised by other believers, the whole community and, to some extent, self-examination. Section
5 formulates more specific hypotheses and tests them using two sets of contemporary data: a
survey on religious practice and values on a sample of 4,554 Catholics and an international crosssection of the supply of Catholic religious and health professionals. Results support that
confession is effective in encouraging compliance with the ethical code. It also seems to have less
exploitative power than other religious practices usually considered less prone to abuse, such as
attending mass. Confession is practiced less frequently by educated Catholics, however, which
suggests that alternative systems of moral enforcement are likely to become less costly with more
education. This, together with the finding that the density of priests decreases at high levels of

models which, also following Becker, treat religion as a rational or myopic addiction (Iannaccone, 1990
and 1995a; Durkin and Greeley, 1991).
6

The focus on the costs and benefits of specialization also separates this work from Allen (1995), who
stresses that churches organize themselves in ways that avoid the particular forms of opportunism
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economic development, could explain the current decline of confession. On the contrary, results
do not support substitution between moral and legal enforcement. Section 6 concludes by
discussing the limitations of the analysis and exploring some broader issues.

2. The basic trade-off: specialization versus
transaction costs

As with any other set of rules, moral rules need effective enforcement, which can be provided
by different mechanisms. Given that rules of behavior are usually defined with respect to social
interactions between parties, three possibilities can be distinguished depending on which party is
responsible for enforcement. Under first-party enforcement, it is the individual in breach who
evaluates and sanctions her own conduct. Evaluation takes place in relation to her own reading of
the moral code and the sanction consists of a certain psychological suffering which takes
different forms, often related to guilt. Second-party enforcement is based on verification and
sanction by the party suffering to some extent the consequences of breach. In the moral sphere,
these second parties are usually members of a group or community of peers, who exert pressure
on non-compliant members through diverse means, from shaming to ostracizing or even killing
them. Lastly, under third-party enforcement, specialized agents, usually priests, verify behavior
of group members and punish those who do not follow the rules. Auricular confession of sins is a
version of third party enforcement in which repentant believers confess their sins orally to priests
in order to be examined and eventually forgiven, thus improving their chances of attaining
salvation in the afterlife.
A key difference between these three solutions for moral enforcement lies in the degree of
specialization. Auricular confession uses more specialized resources, the priests who act as
confessors. Their specialization is enhanced by training and by the extra commitment achieved

triggered by the theological freedom they grant to their members, but disregards the role of specialization
as the driving force of both productivity and opportunism.
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through the stricter celibacy requirement.7 In contrast, other types of Christian enforcement rely
more on mutual control, in the case of second-party enforcement (for example, through public
confession and satisfaction; sectarian policing, ostracism and reputational losses), or on selfservice, in the case of pure self-examination. Specialization generally produces better outcomes
at lower costs. This is also the case for auricular confession, which could produce more effective
self- and social-control for a variety of reasons, mainly related to lower costs, a superior scope of
services and finer-tuned incentives.
With respect to costs, auricular confession probably requires less effort in self-evaluation of
believers than a system of pure self-examination. Confessing to a specialist also avoids the
collective action problem that is typical of active mutual control and peer pressure, which makes
cooperation less feasible (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Kandel and Lazear, 1992), especially in
anonymous and large societies, as argued by club models of sects and churches (Iannaccone,
1988, 1992 and 1994a; Montgomery, 1996).
Regarding the scope of services, in contrast to public confession and penance as well as to
voluntary informal confession, the auricular version maintains secrecy, discouraging gossip,8 and
increasing the scope of sins covered by the system to those whose disclosure would damage the
penitent’s reputation. Compared to self-examination, its inter-personal nature offers greater
possibilities for psychological counsel and consolation.9 In particular, face-to-face interaction
between priest and penitent reduces the risk of self-deception, by utilizing innate psychological
structures.10 It also reduces the symmetric risk that strong-willed individuals will give themselves

7

In the past, there was even greater specialization: it is no coincidence that the mendicant orders,
originally dedicated to preaching (Dominicans) and teaching believers by example (Franciscans) and later
to confession, became so important during the 13th century, after annual confession was made mandatory
and its theology and practice had been much refined.
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On the role of gossip, see Barrow (1992).
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This consolation function is given equal status to the control function by Tentler (1977).
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Human brains have evolved innate difficulties for lying (Damasio, 1994), often fall prey of selfdeception (Trivers, 1985 and 2000), reach self-serving judgments about fairness (Kahneman and Tversky,
1995) and are well-equipped to detect cheaters (Trivers, 1971 and 1985; Cosmides, 1985 and 1989;
Cosmides and Tooby, 1992), all of these being traits that are significantly affected by direct personal
contact.
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rigorist rules in the process of self-controlling their behavior.11 Similarly, it reduces the problems
posed by the categorical and contradictory structure of moral rules that have to be applied to a
wide variety of situations in which compliance is not always socially optimal.12 Moreover,
specialization makes the judicial nature of confession possible, increasing the certainty of
salvation with respect to self-examination and thus obtaining a superior psychological service.
Finally, the information gathered in confession and its secret nature enhance the capacity of
priests to act as implicit mediators and alleviate social conflicts, a point underscored by medieval
historiography (e.g., Biller, 1998a, 23).
Less obviously, auricular confession made it possible to develop a more sophisticated
structure of incentives, based on subjective evaluation of performance, individual tailoring of
moral standards and additional incentives created through changes in the structure of beliefs.
First, the economic theory of incentives easily explains in terms of optimal deterrence some
apparent ambiguities and contradictions in the theology of confession. The latter has been
criticized as confused (Lea, 1896) and paradoxical (Tentler, 1977: 365) in that its ambiguity
leaves substantial uncertainty and discretion easily leads to abuse. However, ambiguous rewards
seem reasonable when considered as a subjective evaluation of performance, because they may
contain the dysfunctional “gaming” behavior induced by a more explicit and objective
evaluation.13 Second, negotiated penance allows adjustment of the parameters of the incentive
function to each specific individual situation. Establishment of discretionary penances resembles
a relational contract while the fixed tariff of the Penitential books was more like an explicit
contract, with all the limitations an explicit contract entails. Under private confession, it is the
role of the confessor to set standards of behavior adjusted to individual circumstances, thus
increasing motivation for recurring sinners and making Church membership appeal to a greater
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As shown by Bénabou and Tirole (2001), both risks are greater when individuals have difficulties in
ascertaining the veracity of excuses and ex-post rationalizations. As two sides of the same phenomenon,
weak-willed individuals may end up under-controlled, while strong-willed individuals fall into
compulsive self-restraint. In this line, compulsively puritan morals could result from the same process as
miserliness, workaholism or anorexia.
12

Emphasized by Kaplow and Shavell (2001 and 2002) and Shavell (2002).
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See, for instance, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994). In our context, subjective evaluation of
performance offers the added advantage of not suffering the risk that the principal might renege on the
reward.
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range of people.14 Thirdly, the theology of purgatory also allowed the development of a complex
system of accounting of sins and trading of merits between believers and the Church. This made
it possible to keep incentives alive even after absolution, as it motivated penitents to produce
additional satisfaction during their lives and after death. It also provided additional incentives to
saints, as they can now transfer their merits to sinners.
Greater specialization, however, is not free but incurs additional transaction costs. Despite its
potential productive advantages, auricular confession can easily become an exploitative device
for the benefit of the priesthood. The history of auricular confession can therefore be understood
as a constant struggle to reach the advantages of specialization while implementing costly
safeguards to contain moral hazard. In terms of effort, opportunism went from not providing
sufficient access to confession services, to performing the function inadequately and taking
penance and absolution decisions that were too lenient or too strict. Priests can also abuse their
privileged position to obtain personal benefits, from sexual access or inheritance rights to
promoting their own ideology. Furthermore, transaction costs are present not only at the level of
the confessing priests but also at higher levels in the hierarchy. Some Popes, for instance, sold
indulgences conferring salvation, not only remission of temporal punishment. All kinds of
safeguard were also implemented including, among many others: training priests to “manage
shame” and “not teach evil” when questioning; secrecy, which is binding on both priests and
penitents, making confession first-party enforcement; hierarchical control, by subjecting priests
to stricter confession practice; jurisdiction, perhaps to avoid absolution shopping; confessional
boxes, to physically separate priest and penitent, in use—significantly—since the second half of
the 16th century; and for many centuries compensating confessors with alms given by penitents,
which probably motivated priests to perform such a tedious task. Despite all these safeguards, as
in any exchange, opportunism was never fully controlled and often caused scandals. Those
relating to the sale of indulgences (for instance, by promising salvation and not only remission

14

See, for instance, Delumeau (1992: 293-295) and Tentler (1977: 17 and 318). This compares
dramatically with the emphasis of Calvin on applying a uniform standard. An additional strategy of the
Catholic church to avoid losing followers demanding stricter standards included promoting stricter
internal organizations. This ties in with spatial-location models of church positioning (Pita-Barros and
Garoupa, 2002: 570).
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from temporal punishment) were only the most famous, thanks to their role in Martin Luther’s
Theses.
In addition to facing substantial transaction costs, the specialization advantages of auricular
confession may disappear with economic development. The personal nature of confession
services means that their productivity lags behind the rest of the economy.15 Given resource
mobility, the cost of confession would tend to grow over time, in a chronic case of Baumol’s
disease (Baumol, 1967). In most personal services, from medicine to music, technological change
is possible, even if it usually involves some degree of self-service and drastic changes in the
nature of the service. However, innovation is severely constrained in sacramental confession
because physical capital is not a good substitute. In fact, the Catholic church requires a personal
encounter, precluding confession via e-mail or even the telephone, confining new technologies to
sending prayers and providing conversation. The consequences of this constraint can be
illustrated by considering the productivity and price of health care if there were no pills or
machinery. From this perspective, the recent evolution of confession—and moral enforcement,
more generally—can be seen as an adjustment to environmental changes that modify its
production costs. While the costs of controlling confessors have probably changed little over the
centuries, production costs have risen substantially because confession requires costly and wellmatched human capital in a personal interaction, with scant possibilities for technical change.

3. Behavioral evidence

The previous account assumed that the product of confession services may have positive
value. This is far from clear from a rationalistic perspective, from which even the existence of
morality is hard to explain. Findings in Evolutionary Psychology, however, suggest that having a
moral sense and, in particular, religious beliefs and practice may improve fitness. Biology thus
provides an effective substitute for the perfect rationality assumption by clarifying the potential,

9

adaptive (in this sense, efficient) role of beliefs, irrespective of whether they are true or false. We
are evolved for fitness, not for truth, and beliefs may be adaptive despite being contrary to truth.
This helps in correcting the misunderstanding, so dominant in all but Austrian economics, of
scientific rationality as a superior, or even the only, adaptive mechanism.
More importantly, functional hypotheses about religious institutions emerge naturally from
such a view. Just like any other product of evolution, instincts are adaptive to a certain
environment.16 However, many of them may have become non-adaptive since human beings
modify their environments faster than the pace of adaptation attainable by natural selection. For
instance, strong sex drive and appetite for food were probably more adaptive for hunter-gatherers
living in the Pleistocene than they are for modern human beings now, given the shorter life
expectancy and riskier environment of our ancestors. Since then, human beings have drastically
modified their environment, increasing their life expectancy and making living less risky. But
meanwhile, their genetically-wired instincts have not kept up. The demand for non-genetic
control devices is therefore clear, be they moral or pharmaceutical. Similar arguments can be
drawn up not only for other instincts in the individual sphere (such as fear or happiness) but also
in the social domain, for emotions related to wrath, rage, guilt, regret, revenge, contempt, honor,
love, compassion or envy (Frank, 1988). Religions may thus be cultural adaptations that help
“modern” human beings to socially- and self-control ancient instincts. A classic example comes
from Adam Smith’s remark that “[i]n the Decalogue we are commanded to honour our fathers
and mothers. No mention is made of the love of our children” (Smith, 1759: 266). Moreover,
instincts are not only something to control but are also important in the functioning of the cultural
control mechanisms themselves. Religions generally recruit ancestral instincts to back beliefs—
thus fear, a natural aversion to danger, might well be the driving force behind beliefs in the
afterlife, the most universal recurring theme of religions (Boyer, 1994 and 2001).17

15

Confession is definitely labor-intensive. Jesuit priests at a New York parish confessed an average of
11,142 confessions in a year at the end of the 19th century and this average was not exceptionally high
(O’Toole, 2000).
16

See, for a summary, Pinker (1997: 363-424).

17

Conflicting evolutionary views are held, however, as to whether religious institutions can or cannot be
expected to be adaptive at the individual and group level. The controversy is also intense between
adaptive and exploitative functionalities, as many scholars interpret religion in terms of a more or less
exploitative use of mental tools previously designed to solve other problems, considering it a cultural
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Confession of sins fits neatly in this framework. In both Christian and non-Christian cultures,
it provides incentives and articulates enforcement mechanisms that may well inhibit free-riding,
an essential ingredient for intra-group cooperation, by detecting and punishing cheaters and by
promoting conformity. It is no coincidence that primitive Christianity, which was relatively
tolerant in accepting new members through baptism, was tough on deviating behavior after
baptism, but allowed reconciliation through severe penitential exercises. Secondly, it may
improve individual rationality and fitness, by helping to control possibly ill-adapted emotions in
rapidly-changing environments. Finally, when understood as group adaptation, not only
confession but, more generally, moral enforcement has also been (and may still be) constrained
by our ecology to use a double standard for relating with group members and with outsiders,
solving the old puzzle posed by religious hypocrisy that is characteristic of most religious groups.
Confession also makes intensive use of motivational mechanisms grounded in geneticallyengineered, mental building-blocks. Emotions such as guilt and shame play fundamental roles
(Haidt, 2003). Shame management was also a particularly important aspect of the education of
confessors, who had to draw a fine line, using shame to motivate sinners without alienating them.
In addition, emotions often moonlight as code enforcers. For instance, disgust at the sight of
blood and body fluids plays a prominent role in many sex-related taboos and this was used until
recently for controlling sexual behavior.
Finally, evidence accumulates that repentance and forgiveness produce cooperative and
psychological benefits. Game theory experiments show that forgiveness improves many
cooperation strategies. It also enhances psychological well-being (Krause and Ellison, 2003) and
may even have positive health consequences, as suggested by McCullough, Pargament and
Thoresen (2000). Confession may have similarly cathartic effects. It is well established that
reconciliation also happens among primates, supporting the view that it helps social animals to

parasite or a by-product. Compare, for example, Boyer (2001), who emphasizes parasitism and questions
the linkage between religion and moral sense, with Wilson (2002), who sustains a group selection,
adaptive explanation.
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cope with conflict.18 Substantial demand for the relief given by confession is also apparent from
the creation of substitutes and the current proliferation of anonymous confession services.19
Considering these behavioral foundations, it comes as no surprise that “confession [of sins] is
one of the most widespread practices in the world, represented on every continent in every known
period of history” (Sullivan, 1987: 233),20 and should help to dispel the common misconception
that sees it as a Catholic invention.

4. Historical evidence

Skipping its Judaic roots, three main stages can be distinguished in the history of Christian
confession.21 These are characterized by public confession and penance in the high middle ages,
mandatory auricular confession with a priest since the low middle ages and up to today within the
Catholic tradition, and the greater role played by second-party moral enforcement and selfexamination in Protestant churches since the Reformation.
Their history supports two of my claims: the adaptive character of the institution and the
presence of costs and benefits. Adaptiveness is clear in the transition from public to private forms
of confession, with a parallel increase in specialization and introspection; as well as in the
updating of the moral code in synchrony with important environmental changes. The tradeoff of
costs and benefits is also visible in the constant struggle maintained between abuse and

18

See Flack and Waal (2000: 10-12) and the accompanying discussion.

19

See, for example, the fee-based “Confession line” telephone service that advises callers to “let go guilt
and shame” (http://confession900line.com/2395827/, accessed September 8, 2002).
20

Summary descriptions of practices in different religions are given by Aune (1987) and Bianchi (1987).
The common element is the verbalization of wrongs committed in order to repair a breach in the relation
of the individual or the group with God. In primitive cultures, it was often a restorative and purifying
requirement in rites of passage (circumcision, marriage, childbirth, new year), in the preparation of crucial
stages of the production cycle (the hunting season) and in the treatment of sickness.
21

There are plenty of studies on Christian confession, written from different positions, such as those by
Lea (1896) and Hanna (1911). The classic general reference is Tentler (1977). Studies in Biller and
Minnis (1998) contain many references to more recent and narrower historiographical studies. Biller
(1998a) surveys some of them.

12

reinforced safeguards, in the recurrent cycles of laxity and reform and, lastly, in the durability of
the institution.

4.1. Primitive and high medieval church
The primitive Church was very willing to forgive sinners at baptism, but very tough with
sinning members, who were often expelled. Hints of second-party enforcement are abundant in
the first century, with mentions of the use of letters of recommendation written by Christians in
good standing, occasional mutual confession, community sanctions and correction before
witnesses.22 From 150 to 650, a system of “Canonical Penance” developed to reconcile sinners
with the Church. Authors differ in their accounts but it seems that confession was mostly public,
penances were extremely harsh and reconciliation was partial in its effects and non-reiterable.
Confession was made before the congregation, the bishop and the council of presbyters. Even if
the public reading of sins was declared unnecessary in 459, penance and reconciliation for many
sins were still public much later, and penitents were allowed access only to the vestibule of the
church. Penance was also arduous and protracted, initially lasting several years, and had to be
performed before absolution. After some controversy in the 3rd century, even capital sins such as
murder, adultery and apostasy could be forgiven, but capital sinners lost good standing in the
Church and remained permanently disabled for the priesthood, marriage or the enjoyment of
conjugal rights. Understandably, as the rite of penance could only be performed once in a
lifetime, many postponed it until they were dying. In the 5th century, confessions were commonly
heard at the beginning of Lent and penitents were absolved on Holy Thursday after public
penance that still included fasting, public humiliation, the wearing of sackcloth and the denial of
sacraments during Lent. Fulfilment of penance was in some cases checked by requiring the
penitent to bring witnesses.
By the 4th century, at the time of Augustine, bishops preferred the practice of private (secret)
confession for private sins, while maintaining public confession or at least public penance for
public sins or when the confessor thought that publicity would be useful. As a consequence, in

13

the 6th century, the previous system of Canonical penance was increasingly exceptional, being
reserved for the elderly and the moribund. Furthermore, alternative forms of reconciliation had
appeared: private confession practiced by monks; entering a monastery, with cleansing
consequences similar to those of Baptism; and even, after showing repentance, taking
communion without confession. Private penance, characterized by being secret and reiterable,
with lighter penances, became predominant in many areas during the 7th century.
Eventually, after the 7th century, a series of manuals known as Penitentials, which originated
from Irish monasteries and prescribed appropriate penance for each sin, became increasingly
popular. Confession was private and penance was reiterable but still required hard penitential
exercises, including fasting, abstinence, corporal punishment, pilgrimages, entering a monastery
and exile. With their examination questions and tariffs for sins, the Penitentials introduced
method and standardization, while emphasizing a judicial view that sacrificed the moral reform
of believers. However, perhaps because of its privacy, the system was soon plagued with
corruption, which took the form of commutation of penances by paying alms and masses, as well
as substitution of penitents. As from the 9th century, Carolingian reform attempted to correct
these abuses.

4.2. Auricular confession to priests
Features introduced by the Penitential system were gradually reinforced between the 9th and
13th centuries, resulting in greater privacy, psychological penance and greater discretion for
confessors. The Penitentials had already established private confession and reiterability but now
the system became less rigorous with the gradual introduction of absolution before completion of
penance, a practice that had became well established by the 11th century. Performance of penance
was left to the penitent and often commuted into prayer and almsgiving, even though a weaker
form of Canonical Penance was still used for the most serious sinners. Penances also became
more casuistic. Instead of strictly following a tariff set ex ante, they were established freely by
the confessor for each case, after consideration of aggravating and extenuating circumstances.

22

See sources in Fernández Rodríguez (2000: 136). See also Hopkins (1999: 93-95 and 121-131) for the
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Penitential books, with their fixed tariffs of sins, were replaced by Summas for Confessors, which
adopted this casuistic approach. As from the 12th century, priests were advised to bargain with
penitents: instead of the penance being imposed on the sinner, it had to be accepted and, to some
extent, negotiated, with penances being set in proportion to the individual’s strength. At the same
time, as from the second half of the 12th century, a more prominent role was given to purgatory,
this being a situation of temporal punishment for sinners who were absolved but were not
completely free from venial sins, or had not fully paid “satisfaction” for their sins. It was only on
this temporal punishment that trade of merits (mainly, the achievement and purchase of
indulgences) was, at least in principle, possible. Finally, annual confession was eventually made
obligatory at the 4th Lateran Council in 1215, completing a model that is essentially still in place
in the Catholic church.
All these changes radically altered the relative importance of the different types of
enforcement and developed a more sophisticated system. Privacy eliminated the role of second
parties; discretion and casuistry enhanced the role of priests; and the psychological nature of
penance (based on doubt, shame and guilt) plus the requirements of examination of conscience,
sorrow and amendment reinforced individual introspection. Except for restitution, enforcement
was left to the conscience of penitents, especially to their faith and understanding of the always
unclear requirements of sorrow and purpose of amendment. Greater introspection did not
necessarily mean weaker incentives, however, because forgiveness continued to be conditioned
not only by fulfillment of the set penance but also by prior examination of conscience, sincere
sorrow for sin (oscillating ambiguously between contrition and attrition), intention to amend, and,
when judged necessary by the confessor, restitution to those harmed by the penitent. In addition,
mandatory annual confession, perhaps the most controversial reform, also boosted both
introspection and third-party enforcement, in a move that seems consistent with a “laxer-butbroader” argument.
These changes in beliefs and their supporting organization fit well in the context of more
general and rapid changes taking place in the societies of the low middle ages. Moving from the
primitive public systems and the fixed tariff of the Penitentials to more private, psychological,
casuistic and adjustable penances ties in with the growing specialization of the church and civil

first steps from second- to third-party enforcement and the early conflict between rigorism and laxism.
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branches of the legal system (Berman, 1983) and the ensuing reduced scope of the Church’s
jurisdiction, which, in addition, separated at the same time the internal forum of sacramental
confession judging sins from the external forum of ecclesiastical judges judging crimes.
Confession thus becomes more specialized, and allegedly more effective, while public
enforcement was reserved for other jurisdictions. The case for environmental adaptation is also
clear with respect to the contents of the Christian moral code. Historical studies of confession
manuals show, for instance, how such manuals increasingly focused on sins committed by
professionals in the exercise of their trade, in response to the economic growth and greater
specialization achieved during the 13th century (Le Goff, 1980). A similar adaptation in the
discussion of sins related to birth control is reported by Biller (1998b). More importantly, the
whole idea of purgatory has been linked to economic changes during the first two centuries of the
millennium (Le Goff, 1984). The new theology is also contemporary with the reappropriation of
ancient Greek science, with changes in Christian ethics in favor of technological change (Benz,
1968; White, 1978), and with an explosion of theological ideas that have been considered
essential for human dignity and liberty (Novak, 1998). Later, the liberal reversal of the scholastic
treatment of usury and many other commercial issues by the theologians of the Salamanca school
were also in step with the problems posed by inflation during the 16th century (Grice-Hutchinson,
1952; Rothbard, 1995: 97-133). Lastly, these theological and organizational changes in beliefs
were also supported by substantial, simultaneous investments in their production and
sustainment. The innovations were introduced at the same time as the building of the Gothic
cathedrals, the artistic production of the 13th century,23 and the explosion of poverty or mendicant
orders, whose members credibly led believers not only by preaching but also by example.24
This “adaptationist” interpretation of the evolution of confession in the low middle ages
departs drastically from the view held in several works by Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison (1992
and 2002), who see purgatory, the sale of indulgences and, apparently, the whole institution of
auricular confession purely as rent extraction devices. The refinement of confession in the 13th

23

Duby (2000: 49) stresses the difference between this art and that of the monasteries, in which
investments were made with a view to achieving salvation by having monks pray for the believers buried
there, often after paying for their sepulchers in a flourishing market for afterlife services.
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century surely created new transaction costs, but this might have only been the price of additional
specialization advantages over and above transaction-costs. Without denying that such
innovations provided additional scope for rent seeking, it is unlikely that such a vast, and lasting,
restructuring of beliefs and organization can be explained as mere rent seeking. In addition, the
explanation in terms of price discrimination and rent seeking also runs against the historical
context. In their 1992 work, Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison explain the greater role given to
purgatory and the restructuring of confession in the 13th century as price discrimination.
However, these innovations took place at a time of substantial heretical competition, and this
does not tie in with a price discrimination purpose. A simple, lower-price interpretation does not
fit the facts either, both because the reform upgraded a more lenient practice and because
contemporaneous heresies held both higher and even lower standards (Biller, 1998a, 18-23).
Again, this does not preclude an evolution in the direction of leniency in later centuries.
Similarly, Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison (2002) argue that rent seeking through price
discrimination was the main feature of the system in the 16th century, causing the Reformation.25
However, optimal-deterrence sanctions (including both some penances and the prices of
indulgences) also increase with wealth and rank (Becker, 1968). This makes it difficult to
distinguish optimal sanctions from a price discriminating schedule when sanctions took the form
of monetary compensation going to the Church (and also, usually, to the Crown). Furthermore, in
such instances, when using explicit prices in the remission of time in purgatory, the Church was
following a practice that has been widely recommended in the economic analysis of criminal law
at least since Becker (1968), namely, that fines are more efficient than other forms of punishment
(for example, Posner, 1998: 246).

24

Compare with Schmidtchen and Mayer (1997), who model the licensing of the mendicants as a way of
appropriating rents by the Pope, an argument inconsistent with the greater discretion given to confessors
compared to the earlier penitential system.
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Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison (2002) recognize, however that, in itself, rent seeking does not account
for the failure of the Reformation in much of Europe. They therefore introduce the ad hoc assumption that
rent seeking was more prevalent in countries where the Reformation failed and then test this assumption
indirectly, through laws on primogeniture. This poses two problems. In addition to the debatable link
between primogeniture and rent seeking, their source of data (Swanson, 1967) describes a map of
European inheritance customs that runs counter to most published work on the subject (see Le Roy
Ladurie [1976: 27], Thirsk [1976: 179, citing Abel, 1958: 154] and Todd [1990: 35]), leading them, for
instance, to wrongly classify Sweden and Denmark as areas of partible-inheritance and France and Spain
as jurisdictions under primogeniture, which was not the case for most of their regions.
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4.3. Protestant churches
Initially, Lutheran churches maintained the duty of confessing to a minister before
communion,26 even if they revoked the annual obligation to confess, required less detail and
changed the liturgy to emphasize that forgiveness came from God and not from the priest or the
Church. In most places, however, different versions of general confession and absolution soon
became dominant, favored by political decisions and despite believers’ occasional opposition.
This soon became almost general practice and today most Protestants confess silently directly to
God, most often through the general statements of confession and absolution of the Communion
service, with only some evangelical churches allowing for public confession of sins.
The distinguishing feature of mainstream Protestantism is the lesser importance of specialized
third-party enforcement by the clergy,27 in connection with a theology that greatly diminished the
privileged role of the Church as an intermediary between God and the people. It correspondingly
developed substitute enforcement mechanisms, increasing mutual enforcement by second parties
(other believers and citizens) and/or by the first party (self-examination).28 In addition, the
Reformation strengthened political and legal, that is, non-moral, enforcement.
The particular solutions adopted were diverse, but, with respect to moral enforcement, many
Protestant groups reinforced mechanisms of mutual control, introducing radical sectarian
practices.29 These are best illustrated by the selection and enforcement practices of the American

26

For a summary, see Caspari (1950: 222-223). Among the main reformers, Luther considered it
essential, Zwingli opposed it and Calvin was hesitant about abolishing it (Tentler, 1977: 349-350), but all
condemned its theology (p. 351).
27

This is clearer in its evolved forms, after the demise or growth of clergy-dominated regimes, such as
some sects or the theocracy established by Calvin in Geneva.

28

This hypothesis about substitution between enforcement mechanisms has been confirmed empirically
by measuring the differences in the sets of values held by Catholics and Protestants with respect to
different enforcement mechanisms (Arruñada, 2003). The emphasis on second-party enforcement is
highly visible in the prominent role played by elders in the practice of “family visitation,” instituted by
Calvin and followed to this day by some reformed churches, by which teams of two elders (or an elder
and a minister) regularly visit the home of each church member to discuss the spiritual health of the
family (see, for instance, Jong, 1992-1994).
29

See Glaeser and Glendon (1998), who model Calvinist predestination theology as soft second-party
enforcement.
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sects described by Weber (1920b).30 Even Calvin’s Geneva relied on elected laymen for
controlling individual behavior. In their more severe forms, these mutual control institutions
generally survived only in small groups, but large communities also kept depending for moral
enforcement on milder forms of mutual control, with self-examination oriented toward mutual
control. These two elements were also prominent in non-religious ethics developed in Protestant
environments. A major example is Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), and his
advice that we should evaluate our own deeds from the perspective of the “impartial spectator,”
being well aware of the constant activity of this second-party enforcer.

4.4. Catholic confession now
Since the last third of the 20th century, auricular confession has been in crisis, as many
Catholics do not comply with the annual duty to confess and those who do have moved away
from detailed confession.31 Furthermore, many communities have substituted individual auricular
confession with general absolution before confession, using a loophole in Canon law that was
originally devised for cases of danger-of-death or grave necessity, such as soldiers in time of war.
Strictly speaking, serious sins should be confessed individually before another general absolution
is received. However, general absolution is most often used in normal situations without
subsequent individual confession and this practice has become widespread, despite opposition by
the hierarchy of the Church.32 More importantly, the innovation seems to respond well to the

30

Notice that it is difficult to separate here the role of voluntary confession to the community and mutual
monitoring of behavior by the community. In principle, a pure system of mutual monitoring should not be
seen as a variety of confession but, in practice, it often leads to forced confessions. This was the case, for
instance, in the Salem trials in 1692, in which public confession was used to escape accusation of
witchcraft and again during the revivalist Great Awakening movement in New England in 1734 (Aune,
1987: 638).
31

Estimates of compliance with the annual duty to confess are around 50% for American Catholics
(Davidson et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2000).
32

General absolution is regulated as the third rite of the Ordo Paenitentiae (Code of Canon Law, 961963). In some areas (Australia or Chicago) and for some periods (Advent, Lent), it has been widespread,
as evidenced by the numerous controversies and confirmation of the formal rules. See, for example,
McClory (2001) and Congregation for Divine Worship (1999 and 2000), as well as, for the official
position of the Church, Pope John Paul II’s post-synodal apostolic exhortation Reconciliatio et
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preferences of both the laity and the clergy, at least in developed countries.33 These changes in
Catholic practice could be seen as part of the same historical tendency that reached a critical
point with the Reformation, especially considering the movement of younger Catholics away
from an institutional conception of faith towards an individual one, with greater reliance on
second- and probably first-party enforcement.34

5. Quantitative evidence
5.1. Hypotheses and data
The previous analysis suggests several testable hypotheses with respect to the relative
effectiveness and the evolution of confession. First, considering specialization advantages,
auricular confession should be more effective than other religious practices, such as prayer or
mass attendance. It should also provide greater scope for priests to condition penitents’ behavior
to the benefit of themselves or the Church.
These “effectiveness” and “rent extraction” hypotheses will be tested by examining how
auricular confession and other religious practices (prayer, communion, mass attendance) interact
with several significant stated actions, which are assumed to provide benefits directly for the
needy (helping the poor) or the Church (religious volunteering and money given to the Church).
Survey data collected in 1994 on 4,554 Catholics (summarized in Table 1) will be used to
estimate ordered probit regressions, given that answers were categorical, unless specified
otherwise. Demographic controls for marital status, income level, sex and age of the respondent

Paenitentia (1984), which urged a return to the frequent and regular practice of individual confession,
reiterated, for instance, in his 2001 and 2002 Letters.
33

The universal character of these tendencies is unclear, however, as many poor Christians (both
Catholics and Protestants) living in less-developed countries demand a traditional and solidly
institutionalized religion, as argued by Jenkins (2002).

34

Younger Catholics “emphasize a direct, intimate relationship with God. They view faith as very
personal, having little to do with pronouncements of the magisterium or participation in the sacraments
[…. For them,] concern with whether an individual is a ‘good person’ dominates their discussions…
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will be introduced, as well as the intensity of their beliefs in heaven and hell. Regressions will be
presented with and without belief variables, however.
On the other hand, auricular confession should play a smaller role when its costs increase or
when alternative enforcement systems, at both individual and social levels, become more
efficient. Quantitative data allow the testing of three hypotheses related to better education of
believers, increased costs of auricular confession and competition from legal enforcement.
The “education” hypothesis maintains that the comparative advantage of confession decreases
with the level of education of the laity. Two reasons can be given for this. On the one hand, better
education could facilitate self-examination and first-party enforcement that may thus substitute
third-party enforcement by priests. Such movement away from specialization may be optimal
when there are economies of scope in the investments in human capital required for different
activities (Rosen, 1983). This may well be the case with respect to acquisition of the abilities
needed for general productive activities and moral self-enforcement. The most important
economies of scope in this field may have been those caused by literacy, which allowed greater
access to printed matter, including the Bible. On the other hand, educated believers may demand
confessors of higher quality, on a level with their human capital. This conjecture ties in with the
historical practice of the Church, which used to match penitents and confessors, as described by
Tentler (1977: 62-63). The education hypothesis will be tested by considering how confession
practice changes with education level in the same sample of Catholics referred to above.
Confession practice will be measured in two ways, as a binary variable (defined as zero if the
respondent does not confess at all and as one, otherwise) and as a polychotomous variable
measuring the frequency of confession, which will be compared to frequency of prayer,
communion and mass attendance. In order to discriminate between the two rationales, the
opinions of laypersons on the role of the laity and the quality of priests will be studied to see how
they change with respondents’ education. If education enhances self-enforcement, educated
Catholics should think that the role of the laity is more important. If education causes an
increasing mismatch between the quality of penitents and priests, more educated Catholics should
hold worse opinions on priests.

Instead of learning church teaching, their religious education consisted of learning to be a ‘nice person’”
(Williams and Davidson, 1996: 274 and 286).
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The “cost disease” hypothesis contends that third-party moral enforcement through priests is
vulnerable to economic development in the rest of the economy. It will be tested by examining
how the supply of Catholic priests changes with economic growth both in a US time series and in
a cross-section of countries. Country-level data on the supply of religious and healthcare
professionals for years 1998-2001, collected from several public sources, will be used to examine
how they change with Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Finally, the “legal enforcement substitution” hypothesis maintains that greater reliance on the
rule of law could also be a substitute for lesser moral enforcement, making religion, and
consequently confession, less necessary in motivating good behavior. This potential effect of
legal substitution will be tested by examining how the supply of Catholic priests per Catholic
varies across countries with their degree of political development, measured by the index of
political rights built by Freedom House.

5.2. Results
Econometric results confirm the effectiveness of confession and do not support the rent
extraction argument, as both the practice and frequency of confession seem to be more closely
related to charitable activities by the faithful than to transfer of resources from them to the
Church. This is observed by comparing the models presented in Table 2. With respect to helping
the poor, only prayer shows slightly higher (but not significantly higher) coefficients than
confession frequency. The opposite happens with contributions to the Church, both in time
(measured by the Volunteer variable) and, especially, money (ChurcGive) with respect to
communion and, with even more significant differences, mass attendance. These results seem
inconsistent with the argument that confession is exploitative relative to other religious practices.
Furthermore, the presence of belief variables in the models discards an obvious candidate for a
common cause. Estimations using binary variables for religious practice and seemingly unrelated
regression give similar results.
Models shown in Table 3 support the hypothesis that improved education for the laity reduces
the demand for confession. Above all, education presents a negative coefficient on confession
frequency that contrasts with its positive coefficients on prayer and communion frequencies. The
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coefficient on communion frequency (but not that on mass attendance, perhaps as a consequence
of the weekly obligation to attend mass) is consistent with a result obtained by Sacerdote and
Glaeser (2001) who explain it as a consequence of social interaction. When compared with
confession, the most revealing result is the positive coefficient of education on prayer frequency,
given that no social interaction is in play. This, therefore, seems driven by complementarity with
education, just the opposite of confession. Furthermore, Catholic education only partially
counterbalances the effect of non-religious education. Also, those who think the laity should play
a greater role and hold doubts on the quality of men going into the priesthood tend to quit
confession and to receive communion and attend masses less often. This contrasts with the
effects, respectively insignificant or small, that these two variables have on praying.
The findings that more educated Catholics think the role of the laity is more important and
hold a better opinion on the quality of their new priests (Table 4) suggest that the negative effect
of education on the practice of confession is probably due more to enhanced self-enforcement
than to an increased mismatch between the qualities of confessors and educated penitents. This is
also consistent with the previous finding that education increases prayer frequency.
Data on Catholic priests is consistent with the cost disease hypothesis as, above a certain level
of economic development, density of priests starts to decrease. Figure 1 depicts this evolution for
the USA, where Catholic priests per thousand Catholics increased before 1945 but fell
afterwards. Table 5 shows the generality of this pattern in an international cross-section of
countries, for which the density of Catholic priests also increases at low levels of GDP. However,
above a certain point, it decreases, as revealed by the negatively significant sign of squared GDP.
The same happens for health personnel. In fact, all the professions considered reach their
maximum density in the same range of GDP per capita. However, in religious services, and
particularly in Catholic confession, there are probably fewer possibilities than in healthcare for
making up for this decline with more physical capital. The percentage of Catholics in the
regressions controls for the existence of fixed costs. Its significance suggests that the alleged cost
disease problem is likely to worsen with a decline in the proportion of Catholics actively
practicing their religion. In any case, the removal of this variable does not materially modify the
results obtained for the other coefficients. Admittedly, the observed relationship between
economic growth and the number of priests is compatible with other explanations, such as a
decrease in demand. A fully exogenous “vocation crisis” seems less likely, however.
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Finally, the positive sign of the political rights variable in the third model in Table 5 does not
support the hypothesis about substitution between moral enforcement by third parties and legal
enforcement.
Summing up, despite its apparent effectiveness, auricular confession seems to face difficulties
in coping with increases in education and to suffer a productivity gap. These demand and supply
factors complement each other in explaining the recent decline of auricular confession. The likely
permanence of these trends suggests that survival of the institution is uncertain.
Even though the key hypotheses deducted from the analytical framework are empirically
confirmed and provide a picture that is consistent with historical records, the nature of the data
may raise some doubts. For instance, the measurement of exploitation is not complete: it may
take place at other levels, especially, through bequests. In addition, current data may say little
about the degree of rent extraction in the past. However, the empirical analysis stands up well
against these criticisms. First, the tests measure rent extraction relative to other religious
practices. There are no obvious reasons why one should expect substantial differences in the
relationships between these practices and rent-extraction across forms of contribution over time.
Second, confidence in the results is enhanced by their consistency, not only in terms of the
quantitative evidence provided by two different data sets but from historical records, which have
been interpreted as a process of environmental adaptation. This might be more important than it
seems, because, in the end, rigor in the analysis of these complex institutions must probably be
judged on grounds of general consistency.

6. Summary and concluding remarks

Overcoming more simple accounts in terms of rent seeking, this article develops a theory of
Catholic confession practice based on a trade-off of specialization advantages and exchange
costs. Specialization advantages come from having priests acting as first-instance judges of moral
conduct, both completing and enforcing a moral code for the purpose of self and social control.
As with any specialization, confession is also subject to moral hazards—those triggered by the
sale of indulgences being only the most prominent.
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The argument relies on three sets of evidence—behavioral, historical and econometric.
Evidence from cognitive sciences provides a solid ground to the starting claim that confession
of sins, and religious institutions more generally, may have adaptive properties, thus overcoming
the narrow perspective of rationalistic assumptions. In particular, these findings from behavioral
science show that the moral sense, religion and, in particular, confession both use and serve to
control ancient instincts that may have become maladapted in our current environment.
Experimental psychology also shows that repentance and forgiveness produce cooperative and
psychological benefits.
The history of confession also supports the adaptive character of the institution and the
presence of both costs and benefits in its functioning. Adaptiveness is clear from observing the
transition from public to private forms of confession, with a parallel increase in specialization and
introspection; as well as in the updating of the moral code in synchrony with environmental
changes. The tradeoff of costs and benefits is observable in the permanent struggle between abuse
and reinforced safeguards at the individual level and the recurrent cycles of laxity and reform at
the general level.
Econometric results support the view that auricular confession to a priest is relatively
effective but not that it is more exploitative than other religious activities, such as praying, taking
communion or attending masses. Both specialization advantages and exchange costs, as well as
their net balance, were hypothesized to change with certain environmental factors. Econometric
tests confirm these effects and are consistent with an explanation of the recent decline of
confession on the basis of changes in demand and supply. Demand for confession decreases
because better education of the laity makes first-party enforcement (self-examination) easier.
Supply decreases because, given the relative difficulty of increasing confessors’ productivity,
confession services, like many other personal services, become costlier at higher levels of
economic development.
The argument has centered on auricular confession but it is applicable more widely. In a
superficial view, other activities of priests seem to be unaffected. For instance, in contrast with
confessors, preachers can use physical capital to reach larger audiences and increase their
productivity. However, these innovations radically transform the service provided. Confession is
a particular case because the service is intrinsically personal. However, to the extent that many
25

priests’ services are also personal, they suffer the same constraints and competition as confession.
On the one hand, priests’ productivity cannot be increased without diluting the personal
dimension of most of their services. On the other hand, education facilitates first-party moral
enforcement. It is likely that these two factors are pushing the priesthood in the same direction:
higher capital investments (including human capital) to provide services of a less personal nature,
which are then used by the laity with greater doses of self-service. Instead of confession and other
personal interactions with a small community, the new “priests” (TV preachers, public figures,
self-help authors) will tend to interact impersonally with their huge communities using mass
media. Personalized services, such as third-party moral enforcement, will tend to be provided
only to the wealthy or for the support of the most important personal decisions. Something
similar may be happening out of religion: while anti-depressants are widely available,
psychotherapy remains a secondary service.
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Table 1. Description and summary statistics of religious practice among Catholics
Description in terms of the
original survey question

Variable
GoConfess

0, if answer to “How often do you
go to private confession with a
priest?” was “Never, almost never”;
1, otherwise
ConfesFrq
How often do you go to private
confession with a priest? a, b, c
PrayerFrq
How often do you start and end the
day with a prayer? a, b, c
CommunFrq How often do you receive
communion? a, b, c
MassFrq
How often do you attend mass? a, b, c
HelpPoor
How often do you actively work to
help the poor? a, b, c
Volunteer
Sum of answers to the questions
“To what extent are you active in
any of the following parish
activities… Parish administration;
evangelization; social outreach? b, c,

Name of
variables in
survey

ObserMean
vations

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

45) doconfes

4,314

.5348

.4988

0

1

45) doconfes

4,314

0

1

-0.811

5.864

54) doprayer

4,352

0

1

-1.688

0.857

43) docommun

4,321

0

1

-2.605

1.657

41) domass
50) helppoor

4,356
4,278

0
0

1
1

-3.565
-0.899

1.866
2.729

90) churgive

4,175

0

1

-1.966

3.463

246) educlevl

4,421

0

1

-1.666

2.233

247) gradskul
248) highskul
250) inrcskul

4,370

0

1

-1.218

2.114

2) layrole

4,443

0

1

-1.942

1.222

31) badprist

4,317

0

1

-1.383

1.749

262) marystat

4,352

.1245

.3302

0

1

277) income

4,015

0

1

-1.613

2.393

158) gender
159) yrborn
6) heaven

4,166
4,183
4,487

.3584
0
0

.4796
1
1

0
-1.891
-0.315

1
2.614
7.209

25) hell

4,359

0

1

-3.543

0.666

84) oncouncl,
87) evangel,
89) outreach

d

ChurGive
EducLevl
CathEduc

LayRole

BadPrist

Single
Income
Male
Age
Heaven
Hell

How much money did you give to
the Church in 1993? b, c, e
Highest number of years of
schooling you have completed c, f
Built by adding total or partial
attendance to Catholic schools at
different levels, from answers to
several questions c
How much you agree or disagree
with the statement: “The laity’s role
in the Church is just as important as
what priests do” b, c, g
How much you agree or disagree
with the statement: “I worry about
the type of men who are going into
the priesthood these days” b, c, g
1, if marital status single; 0,
otherwise
Personal and spouse’s income
received in 1993 before taxes c, h
1, for men; 0, women
Age of the respondent c
How much you agree or disagree
with the following statement:
“There is a heaven” b, c, g
How much you agree or disagree
with the following statement:
“There is a hell” b, c, g

Source of data: Survey of Indiana Catholics, 1994. Originally collected by James D. Davidson in 1994, made available at the
/American Religion Data Archive. For information, visit www.thearda.com.
Notes: a Possible answers were: 1, Daily, almost daily; 2, Several times a week; 3, Weekly; 4, 2 or 3 times a month; 5, About once
a month; 6, Several times a year; 7, 1 or 2 times a year; 8, Never, almost never. b Variables were recoded to make them consistent
with their names. c Variables standardized to be mean zero variance one. d Possible answers were: 1, Very active; 2, Quite active;
3, Somewhat active; 4, Not active. e Eight possible answers ranging from 1 for “did not give to this” to 8 for “$10,000 or more”. f
Possible answers were: 1, Grade school or less; 2, High school; 3, Vocational training after high school; 4, Attended college, but
did not graduate; 5, Graduated from college; 6, M.A, M.S., M.B.A., or equivalent master’s degree; 7, Ph.D., M.D., LL.B., or
equivalent doctorate degree. g Possible answers were: 1, Strongly agree; 2, Agree somewhat; 3, Uncertain; 4, Disagree somewhat;
5, Strongly disagree. h Twelve possible answers ranging from 1 for “less than $10,000” to 12 for “$150,000 or more”.
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Table 2. Behavior and religious practice among Catholics

PrayerFrq

CathEduc
LayRole
BadPrist

(b)

(a)

***

***

*

(0.048)

(0.048)

(0.023)

(0.023)

0.334***

0.060***

0.054**

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.048)

(0.049)

(0.022)

(0.022)

*

0.057

*

0.350

(0.031)

***

(0.067)
***

-0.033

-0.029

0.436

(0.030)

(0.031)

(0.074)

***

0.136

***

0.331

***

(0.068)
0.448

***

(0.074)

0.204

***

(0.031)
0.424

***

(0.032)

0.042

0.046

0.088

***

0.199***
(0.032)
0.413***
(0.032)
0.092***

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.024)

(0.024)

0.018

0.015

0.057

0.058

0.012

0.010

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.042)

(0.042)

(0.020)

(0.020)

0.049**

0.046**

0.173***

0.176***

0.027

0.037*

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.043)

(0.043)

(0.020)

(0.020)

0.037*

0.035*

0.060

0.068

-0.063***

-0.051**

(0.020)

(0.021)

(0.043)

(0.044)

(0.021)

(0.021)

0.146

***

***

***

***

(0.025)

0.243

***

(0.069)
0.077

***

(0.024)
-0.147

***

(0.042)
0.152

***

(0.025)

Hell

**

-0.042

-0.026

-0.159

(0.151)

(0.152)

(0.070)

**

**

0.107

(0.052)
0.151

*

(0.089)
0.099

0.109

(0.052)
0.155

*

(0.053)

*

0.573

**

(0.054)

***

(0.026)
0.180

(0.090)
0.106

0.024

Heaven

***

(0.043)
0.398

***

(0.026)

0.029

-0.163**
(0.071)
0.584***
(0.026)
0.170***
(0.043)
0.414***
(0.026)
0.009

(0.022)

(0.053)

(0.023)

-0.039*

-0.011

0.091***

(0.022)

(0.047)
-1.126

Constant

***

(0.066)
Pseudo R
Wald tests:
ConfesFrq = PrayerFrq
Prob > Chi2
ConfesFrq
=
CommunFrq
Prob > Chi2
ConfesFrq = MassFrq
Prob > Chi2

0.039*

0.340***

(0.042)

2

0.044

(0.023)

-0.151

Observations

0.218

0.158***

(0.024)

Age

0.213

0.158***

0.082

Male

0.121

(b)

(0.023)

(0.069)
Income

ChurGive

(a)

0.242

Single

Volunteer
***

0.138

EducLevl

HelpPoor
(b)

(0.031)
MassFrq

(3)

***

0.055

CommunFrq

(2)

(a)
0.123

ConfesFrq

(1)

-1.131

(0.023)

***

(0.066)

2,935

2,910

2,776

2,760

2,842

2,819

0.02

0.03

0.07

0.07

0.20

0.20

1.09
0.2966
2.93

1.21
0.2704
2.55

3.04
0.0815
2.62

2.51
0.1134
1.76

0.25
0.6186
16.19

0.20
0.6579
15.62

0.0870
15.30
0.0001

0.1102
13.89
0.0002

0.1053
5.79
0.0162

0.1850
6.11
0.0135

0.0001
85.47
0.0000

0.0001
80.87
0.0000

Notes: Models (1) and (3) ordered probit; model (2), tobit, for which also Prob > F.
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1%.
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Table 3. Determinants of religious practices among Catholics
(1)

EducLevl

(3)

(4)

(5)

GoConfess

ConfesFrq

PrayerFrq

CommunFrq

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

*

*

*

*

**

-0.053

(0.028)
CathEduc

(2)

0.043

*

-0.047

(0.028)
0.037

(0.023)
***

-0.051

**

(0.024)
0.030

(0.024)
***

-0.045

(0.025)
0.021

(0.021)
***

0.041
0.038

(0.021)
***

0.053

(0.024)
*

(0.020)

(0.024)

(a)

(b)

**

-0.022

-0.008

(0.025)

(0.025)

0.038

0.056

(0.024)

(0.024)

***

0.032

0.074

(0.020)

(0.020)
***

MassFrq

(b)

0.066

***

(0.021)
***

0.059

***

(0.021)
***

0.047**
(0.021)
-0.063***

LayRole

-0.104

BadPrist

-0.085*** -0.069*** -0.044**
(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.022)

Single

0.446***

0.456***

0.401***

0.380***

-0.019

0.024

-0.006

0.007

0.001

0.012

(0.081)

(0.082)

(0.070)

(0.071)

(0.069)

(0.069)

(0.070)

(0.071)

(0.073)

-0.025

-0.012

-0.034

-0.016

(0.025)

(0.025)

(0.025)

(0.024)

Income

-0.084

***

(0.029)
Male

0.032
0.249

***

(0.028)
Heaven

-0.076

***

(0.029)

0.243

-0.097

(0.021)

-0.079

***

(0.025)
0.015

(0.049)
***

(0.028)
0.056

Hell
Constant

(0.024)

0.022

(0.049)
Age

-0.092

***

(0.024)

**

0.018

0.029

-0.078

-0.057

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.021)

-0.036*

-0.013

-0.176*** -0.154*** -0.138*** -0.120***

-0.075

***

(0.026)

***

(0.024)
0.062

(0.025)
-0.305

(0.043)
0.249

-0.130

***

***

(0.042)
0.406

***

(0.025)

**

(0.070)
-0.115

***

(0.025)
-0.296

***

(0.043)
0.418

***

(0.025)
0.166

-0.208

***

(0.042)
0.341

***

(0.025)

***

(0.021)

-0.082

-0.030

0.008

(0.043)
0.258

-0.081

-0.209

***

(0.043)
0.348

***

(0.025)
0.156

(0.021)

-0.091

**

(0.044)
0.395

***

(0.026)

***

(0.021)

(0.026)
-0.093**
(0.044)
0.400***
(0.026)
0.158***

(0.027)

(0.025)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

0.153***

0.144***

0.062***

0.109***

0.139***

(0.026)

(0.024)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.023)

-0.018

-0.020

(0.59)

(0.63)

Observations 3,045

3,016

3,045

3,016

3,055

3,025

3,023

2,993

3,044

3,013

Pseudo R2

0.06

0.03

0.04

0.04

0.05

0.04

0.05

0.05

0.07

0.04

Notes: All models are ordered probit regressions except model 1 (probit). Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1%.
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Table 4. Determinants of asserted agreement with important role of the laity and worry
regarding the quality of new priests
Laity’s role as important
as that of priests
(Dependent variable: LayRole)
(1)
(2)
EducLevl
CathEduc
BadPrist

0.058**
(0.023)
0.031
(0.019)
0.076***
(0.020)

0.052**
(0.023)
0.034*
(0.020)
0.073***
(0.020)

LayRole
Single
Income
Male
Age

-0.001
(0.067)
-0.066***
(0.024)
-0.056
(0.040)
-0.034
(0.022)

Heaven
Hell
Observations
Pseudo R2

3,075
0.004

0.041
(0.067)
-0.062***
(0.024)
-0.044
(0.041)
-0.026
(0.023)
0.032
(0.021)
-0.091***
(0.021)
3,044
0.006

Are worried about quality
of new priests
(Dependent variable: BadPrist)
(3)
(4)
-0.085***
(0.023)
0.010
(0.019)

-0.091***
(0.023)
0.014
(0.019)

0.080***
(0.019)
0.180***
(0.066)
0.048**
(0.023)
0.010
(0.040)
0.064***
(0.022)

0.076***
(0.019)
0.147**
(0.067)
0.037
(0.024)
0.010
(0.040)
0.060***
(0.023)
-0.050**
(0.021)
-0.085***
(0.021)
3,044
0.008

3,075
0.005

Notes: All models are ordered probit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1%.
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Figure 1. Supply of Catholic priests in the USA, 1820-1997
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Source of data: Priests, Finke and Stark (1992); GDP, Economic History Services,
http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp/gdp_answer.php, visited July 24, 2002.
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Table 5. Supply of Catholic religious and health professionals in a cross-section of
countries

(1)

(2)

(3)

Total Catholic Priests
per million Catholics

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Healthcare professionals per100,000 population
Physicians

Nurses

Dentists

Pharmacis
ts

GDP per capita in 1999
(constant 1995 US$)

1.032***
(0.242)

1.035***
(0.190)

0.769***
(0.205)

0.688**
(0.260)

1.044***
(0.323)

0.612**
(0.246)

0.546**
(0.248)

Square of GDP per capita
in 1999 (constant 1995
US$)

-0.151**
(0.060)

-0.161***
(0.047)

-0.120**
(0.048)

-0.115*
(0.060)

-0.146*
(0.075)

-0.097*
(0.057)

-0.094*
(0.053)

-0.014***
(0.002)

-0.014***
(0.002)

-0.000
(0.003)

-0.014***
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.003)

0.006**
(0.003)

0.188***
(0.065)

0.002
(0.084)

0.019
(0.104)

0.032
(0.080)

0.052
(0.102)

Percentage of Catholics in
the population
Index of political rights
(the higher the index, the
freer the country)
Constant

5.361***
(0.162)

6.096***
(0.182)

6.691***
(0.269)

4.881***
(0.336)

5.723***
(0.418)

3.445***
(0.319)

3.292***
(0.361)

Observations

68

66

64

62

62

62

36

Adjusted R-squared

0.39

0.62

0.67

0.21

0.50

0.24

0.39

Source of data: Priests and density of Catholics, http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/. WHO Estimates of Health Personnel around 1998,
http://www3.who.int/whosis/health_personnel/health_personnel.cfm?path=whosis,health_personnel. GDP data from the World Development
Indicator 2001, World Bank. Index of political rights from Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/table1.htm,
recoded so that the freest countries score higher in the index). All web pages accessed on July 9, 2002.
Notes: All models are OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1%.
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